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1 Introduction
Despite decades of planning and water sector
initiatives, rural water supply poses serious
challenges in India with low coverage, serious
water quality issues and unsustainability of the
source. Prior to the 1990s, water management
had been the responsibility of state-owned public
utilities. The State was recognised as trustee of
these resources and the prime player in basic
service delivery. A top-down, supply-led
institutional structure, treated the end-users as
mere beneficiaries and not direct participants in
the decision-making process. The water sector
reforms have shifted this locus of service delivery
to other players such as private sector and local
communities (Cullet 2007).
The International Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation Decade (1980–90), also known as the
‘Water Decade’, also recognised the limitations
of the top-down approach to service delivery and
encouraged participation by other stakeholders.
In this context, the New Delhi Statement that in
many ways marks the culmination of the decade,
pressed for institutional reforms for an
integrated management of water and specifically
stressed the participation of community in the
management of services, with special emphasis
on the participation of women (United Nations
1990). The Dublin Statement (United Nations
1992) further reiterated the principle of
community management and put a premium on
water by declaring water as an economic good
(UNCED 1992). It is this global context of
institutional reform that provides the normative
push for restructuring the rural drinking water
sector in India.
This article critically investigates the objective of
institutional reform through the principle of
community management1 underlined in the New
Delhi Statement and later the Dublin Statement
and discusses the limitations of the reform
process in the context of Swajaldhara. Following
this introduction, the second section of the
article explores how the reforms entered the
lexicon of the Indian water policy discourse and
states that an alignment at the policymaking
level paved the way for the introduction and up-
scaling of the model. The third section highlights
the policy practice dichotomy of the Swajaldhara
experience against the complex realities of rural
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Uttar Pradesh. In conclusion, the experiences of
Swajaldhara in the context of the objectives of
the New Delhi Statement are assessed.
2 Embedding Swajaldhara in the national water
discourse
Recognised as the flagship reform programme in
the rural drinking water sector, Swajaldhara was
launched on 25 December 2002 by the Prime
Minister of the country, Mr Atal Behari
Vajpayee. It was seen as the convergence of
initiatives taken by the national government,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the
external support agencies to promote the
community-led participatory approach in rural
drinking water supply initiative (GoI 2003). The
programme underlined community participation
in the planning and implementation phases. It
introduced the concept of demand management,
whereby the community will be able to ‘choose’
appropriate and affordable technology.2 It also
placed user value on water through a 10 per cent
community contribution in the planning phase
and monthly water rentals to maintain the water
infrastructure. It therefore marked a gradual
shift towards the role of community participation
and a decentralised pattern of service delivery,
with the government playing the role of
facilitator (World Bank 2006). A basic underlying
assumption of the scheme was that cost sharing
would enable participation and implementation
of water asset ownership.
First, at the national level, there was persistent
dissatisfaction with the supply-driven
approaches. Throughout the Water Decade,
several studies and review projects highlighted
the drawbacks of technocratic systems, with
problems of unsustainable technology and poor
delivery systems. Lack of community ownership
was highlighted as one of the major reasons for
such failures (WWAP 2006). The Swajal project
and the Sector Reform Initiative (1999), based
on the principles of demand management,
provided a positive backdrop and a viable
institutional alternative to the inert structure of
service delivery.
Second, the National Water Policy of 2002,
stressed changes in the institutional mechanism
in terms of a multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary
and participatory approach, whereby ‘existing
institutions at various levels need to be
appropriately re-oriented and re-organized’
(GoI 2002: 3).The policy also stressed the
participatory approach to water resources
management. It noted:
Management of water resources for diverse
uses should incorporate a participatory
approach; involving not only various
governmental agencies but also stakeholders,
in an effective and decisive manner, in various
aspects of planning, design, development and
management of water resources schemes 
(GoI 2002: 5).
Sangameswaran (2006) argues that there is a
perceptive link between the national water policy
discussions and the conventional wisdom that
was reflected in the World Bank documents and
the Swajal project concerning the user charges.
These measures had considerable impact in the
drafting of the tenth Five Year Plan (2002–07)
document and the National Water Policy of 2002,
which accepted the community pays principle
(Nayar and James 2008).
Third, the deliberations at ministerial level, such
as the Cochin Declaration in 1999, also ratified
the alternative approach of community
management; the states were willing to
experiment with the idea of the demand-
responsive approach in rural water supply (WSP
2000). Mr Venkaiah Naidu, Minister of Rural
Development (2002), favoured reform in service
delivery of rural water. Stressing the inefficiencies
of the erstwhile supply-driven approach
(Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme,
ARWSP), which was characterised by serious
under-performance, he noted that a government
run without the ‘participation of stakeholders’,
where water is considered as a free service to be
provided by the government, ‘stifled’ the
development of more efficient, low-cost options
for service delivery and denied users the right to
demand better services (Naidu 2002).
Fourth, the presence of Panchayats (village
governing body) as the third tier of governance
provided effective institutional support for the
inception of a decentralised model of community
participation. For the government, the reform
principle in Swajaldhara was actually aimed at
strengthening the structure of local governance
by generating robust institutions of service
delivery (Naidu 2002). Community participation
and local governance were not regarded as
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competing paradigms but were tied in a
synergistic relationship, where empowered
communities could help in effective rural
governance.
The political mood in the country at the national
and state level looked upbeat and positive in
undertaking the new institutional mechanism of
service delivery in the form of Swajaldhara. The
political consensus helped in the up-scaling of the
Sector Reform project into Swajaldhara in 2002.
3 Policy meets practice: Swajaldhara in Bareilly
Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in
India. As per the population census of 2001, it
accounts for 16 per cent of India’s 102,702 crore
population. Approximately 79 per cent of the
population still lives in rural areas (GoI 2007).
The rate of urbanisation, which is considered an
indicator of development, has been slow in the
state (Jha 2007). The Swajaldhara programme
took place in Bareilly district in the Western
region of the state. It was proposed in five
villages but was only operational in two, Bhartaul
and Chaneta, both located on the urban fringe.3
The programme was approved in 2004/05 and
became operational in 2007. It was envisaged
that the community should actively participate
in the planning phase as well as the
implementation of the programme. The local
NGOs – support organisations (SOs) in this case
– were chosen to facilitate community
mobilisation and training.
3.1 Participation
The villagers identified the tank as the bada nal
(big tap) or the tanki (tank). Very few villagers
and some members of the committee were aware
that a support organisation was involved in the
process of establishing the scheme in their
village. In Chaneta, the villagers knew that there
was a pani ki tanki (water tank) in place but the
logistics of its inception and introduction were
seemingly unknown to them. Conversations with
neighbours or villagers’ proximity to the Gram
Pradhan (head of the governing body) determined
how informed they were about the proceedings in
the village in general, and the tank in particular.
Local patronage ties were effectively used in
mobilising the rural population. This was visible
in the process of generating demand for
connections when the scheme was introduced.
The operator at Bhartaul remarked that a
number of meetings were held. However, not
many villagers could remember a khuli (open)
meeting when the scheme was introduced. Many
of them were sceptical that a meeting had taken
place, and one of the villagers said that the
meeting was held behind closed doors and there
was no consultation process.
This is significant, as the nature of information
that was transferred to the villagers varied
greatly. Most of them were aware that they had
to contribute an amount of money to get a
connection; however the process was determined
not by them but by the key members in the
sociopolitical set-up of the village. A resident in
Bhartaul remarked over the issue of change in
the rents: ‘The poor people have no say: initially
the rent was 15 rupees; who has made it to 30
rupees?’
The Village Water and Sanitation Committee
(VWSC) is the committee of the Panchayat that
oversees the programme in the village. Some
villagers were not even aware that such a
committee existed, and the members themselves
didn’t know that they were members of it. This
was confirmed in my interview with the Gram
Pradhan at Bhartaul when he pointed out that the
11 members of the committee were not aware of
their membership. Either the members’ names
existed on paper only, or the members had
chosen to disassociate themselves from the
committee due to local politics and
dissatisfaction with the committee.
Given the dominance of the Gram Pradhans in the
landscape of the villages, they handled the
operations of the committee. No meetings were
held and any discussions held in the villages
seemed to assume the decisions made by the
Pradhan. The residence of the Pradhan at Bhartaul
and the clinic in Chaneta had emerged as
important sites of decision-making for the
welfare of the villages. However, meetings were
seemingly absent from the calendar of the Gram
Panchayat.4
The local practices and perceptions shaped the
working of the VWSC and also the process
through which Swajaldhara made its entry into
the villages. In a context where participation was
less understood as an inclusionary practice and
more of a ceremonial exercise, it challenged the
bottom-up notion of Swajaldhara from the start.
The overarching role of the Gram Pradhan stunted
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the functioning of the VWSC, and not many
villagers seemed dissatisfied with its lack of
functioning.
3.2 Community ownership
The decentralised bottom-up approach of
Swajaldhara was strongly embedded in the idea
of community. The policy envisaged that once the
villagers could relate to the water infrastructure
as their own, they would be able to sustain and
manage it. This idea arose as a strong counter to
the top-down planning and implementation
model. One of the serious lacunas that plagued
the earlier policy models was that the users were
treated more as subjects than participants in the
process. In the context of Bareilly, where
participation in the planning phase was minimal
and there existed a high level of information
asymmetry in the working of the committee
itself, the idea of community appeared as mere
fiction rather than reality.
Who owns the tank?
In a landscape ridden with information
asymmetry at all levels, many villagers in
Bhartaul and Chaneta did not treat the tank as
their own. For them, it either belonged to the
sarkar (government) or was the result of the
efforts of a benign and concerned Gram Pradhan.
In my field visits, the local people referred to
Swajaldhara tank as the bada nal (big tap) or the
sarkari nal (government’s tap). The incentive for
taking up the scheme was guided by economic
reasons, as they were to pay less for the water
connection than they usually had to pay under
normal circumstances.5 For a tap connection
under the Swajaldhara programme, the villagers
had to pay 900 rupees in Bhartaul and 750
rupees in Chaneta, for which they would have
previously paid approximately 3,000 rupees. This
reduction of payment was the central point of
mobilisation among the villagers.
The idea of a demand-driven scheme met with a
paradox when the Gram Pradhan in Chaneta,
regarding the inception of the scheme, told me
that ‘sarkari kaam-kaaj hai … sab upar se hoke aata
hai’ (this is government’s work, it gets done from
above). In Chaneta, where there were fewer
connections and water quality was a concern,
villagers blamed the government for the
dilapidated state of the infrastructure. There
seemed to be an understanding that the
government was to be held responsible for the
mismanagement of affairs and they should do
something about it.
The idea of community ownership was instituted
to counter the traditional belief of patronage by
the government and inculcate some feeling of
stakeholder participation. However, in a context
where people have relied on the government for
basic services, the idea of management and
ownership was starkly absent. The roots of the
top-down model went deep enough to be
countered by a singular idea of a demand-driven
scheme of community ownership where the
community was not even aware that they were
the ones who had to maintain it.
3.3 Paying for water?
With an ambiguous idea of community in the
local discourse of Swajaldhara, one could not
avoid seeing problems associated with the
lopsided view on collective action. In both
villages, less than 50 per cent of the money was
collected. This led to a maintenance deficit in
the villages. Used to the top-down approach of
service delivery, which Swajaldhara attempted to
change but fell short of countering, many
villagers thought that the tank belonged to the
government and were not comfortable with the
idea of paying for it.
Ambiguous rules and the fluid community of
users had led to the emergence of a parallel
group of free riders who were beneficiaries of the
scheme but were not prepared to pay for water.
The prevalence of these free riders dissuaded
others from paying for their water. The issue of
water quality in Chaneta made the water supply
a valuable commodity. The households that could
‘afford to pay’ for water were doing so, since they
had no recourse: ‘Even if they ask us for 100
rupees, we will still have to pay, how can we stay
without water?’, replied an aaganwadi (basic
health) worker in Chaneta. Households that had
managed to get connections were deemed
‘willing to pay’ from their meagre resources. In
Chaneta, despite quality concerns, poorer
households could not afford to pay and used the
poor quality water.
Some villagers expressed their anguish at the
idea of paying for water. A resident in Chaneta
stated that a number of people belong to the
labour class and a large proportion of the
population is below the poverty line and said,
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‘You cannot expect them to pay’. The water
supply in Chaneta also suffered from
infrastructural problems, especially the
intermittent supply of water due to recurring
faults. This both discouraged willingness to pay
and household ability to pay. Some people who
already had connections were no longer willing
to pay the rents in the absence of a water supply
and instead used the ‘yellow water’. This
adversely affected the agenda of increasing
connections, as most of the people perceived it as
a failed investment.
3.4 Where are the women?
Women were identified as the key beneficiaries of
the programme (GoI 2003). Policy documents
gave due recognition to this fact and underlined
the need for active participation of women in the
working of the committee. However, the non-
participation of women seemed to have been
structured in the institutional implementation of
the project. The State Water and Sanitation
Mission (SWSM) personnel at Lucknow regarded
it as too lofty an objective to be pursued, as this
was seemingly impractical in the rural context of
Uttar Pradesh. The policy implementers, quite
aware of the patriarchal context, were not
enthusiastic about the empowerment agenda
within the policy. Within Swajaldhara, the
mobilisation and participation of women was not
visible in these two villages. Women were
definitely the target users within the scheme but
the patriarchal set-up of these villages prevented
their full mobilisation. In Bhartaul, women
managed to enter the discourse of Swajaldhara in
the mobilisation phase but they were relegated to
the private realm of the household once the tank
was put in place. Their presence was instrumental
in the phase of mobilisation but their
participation in decision-making was absent.
3.5 Role and accountability of the support
organisations (SOs)
The role of the SOs was to prepare and train the
community to maintain the scheme. These
organisations were engaged to give a
participatory framework to the project. They
were the channel of communication between the
bureaucracy, i.e. the District Water and
Sanitation Committee, the SWSM and the
villagers. The SOs, given their proximity to the
local context were delegated the responsibility
for selecting the villages. After a field survey, a
Detailed Project Report was prepared by them to
be sent to the SWSM, to approve and release
funds for the scheme.
The selection of villages was based on the ability
to generate demand for new water schemes
among the villagers. Most of the proposed
villages were in close proximity to the city. The
generation of demand rested on people’s ability
to agree to pay for the scheme. As stated earlier,
not many villagers were aware of any
organisation working in the village. The villagers
in Bhartaul and Chaneta took them to be
thekedaars (private operators) and their role as
civil society actors was not visible in the local
discourse. In Chaneta, the usual complaint was
that SO personnel did not consult the people
during their work and if the villagers raised any
questions, they would be snubbed as being
unaware and uneducated.
The attitude of the local bureaucracy and the
SOs, when dealing with the villagers, was one of
superiority and prejudice, reflecting their belief
that villagers would not have the technical know-
how to maintain a tank. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that the SOs were perceived
to be a link between the villagers and the
bureaucracy and seem to have been caught in a
paradox where the bureaucracy treated them as
the voice of the people whereas the villagers saw
the SOs as an imposition from above.
4 Conclusion
The New Delhi Statement strongly emphasised
community management beyond participation
and stressed the need to develop linkages
between national plans and community needs.
However, the case study reflects a contradictory
image of one-way traffic, where the idea of
community ownership was channelled through a
top-down process of bureaucratic delivery.
Besides the local bureaucracy, it is also the role
of NGOs – or here, the SOs – which needs to be
critically investigated. Implanted in a context
where the top-down model of service delivery was
deeply embedded within the local institutions,
the district level and the SO, the concept of
demand-driven scheme and community
ownership faced systemic reversals. The local
practices of democracy and participation also
influenced the process. The local institutions
reconstructed the core ideas within Swajaldhara;
these included concepts as such as participation
and community ownership. Moreover, the
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 2  March 2012 41
practices of informal institutions such as
patriarchy, patronage and local clientelism also
shaped the implementation of the scheme.
The idea of community, which was strongly
embedded in the policy discourse and was the
bedrock of the flagship programme, did not hold
strong by the time it reached the village – the
potential and the intention had been filtered out.
The community was still a group of beneficiaries
who had to be supplied with water, rather than
agents who could participate in the operation
and maintenance of the scheme. Marginalised at
the inception of the scheme, i.e. in the planning
phase, the village community/user group was
more in the status of subject beneficiaries than
citizen participants. Although designed to be a
bottom-up approach, Swajaldhara became
embedded in a top-down model of service
delivery and faced policy reversals.6
The case study discussed above shows how reforms
that are articulated through global and national
consensus face critical challenges on the ground. It
stresses the need to take a more nuanced approach
to the mechanisms of the frontline service delivery
that include local bureaucracy. Support
organisations and local governance structures are
key to the reform process. It is this space that
demands greater attention and possibly
intervention to address and substantively extend
the boundaries of ‘Some for All’.
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Notes
* This article is based on the field research
undertaken as part of the author’s MPhil
study at the Centre for the Study of Law and
Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
India during 2008–09.
1 There has been a robust tradition of community
management of water in the pre-reform era in
India. The article analyses the reform induced
principle of community management.
2 The approach of demand management was
increasingly promoted by the World Bank to
steer domestic water sector policies in various
parts of the world, especially Asia and Africa
(Joshi 2004). A major thrust in implementing
demand responsive approaches in India came
from the World Bank–UNDP Water and
Sanitation Programme through the Swajal
Project (1996–2002) that became the
forerunner to Swajaldhara.
3 What makes these villages interesting is their
peri-urban nature: both had a large population
of retired army personnel who could afford to
pay for water. This had strong implications for
the selection of the villages in the initial stage.
4 Inference drawn from the interviews held with
villagers.
5 Refers to the cost involved in installation of
water pumps in the houses.
6 Following the reversals in the implementation
of Swajaldhara, the Government of India
revised the rural drinking water guidelines to
the National Rural Drinking Water
Programme. The document recognises water as
a basic need and downplays the idea of charging
for water see www.indiawaterportal.org/
sites/indiawaterportal.org/ files/National
%20Rural%20Drinking%20Water%20Program
me_MoRD_2010.pdf).
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